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Problem and Objectives Analytical Framework
One of the most crucial problems facing the U.S. economy is the possibility of a terrorist attack 
on its food sector.  The implications can be profound for its stakeholders, who are highly 
dependent on this sector for their economic livelihood as well as their food supplies.
The U.S. Bioterrorism Act of 2002 was enacted to improve the ability of the United States to 
The facility maximizes its expected profit as described in: 
(1)  max E(πi) = E[Pyi(- Ci (Yi) – Ai (m1i,…,mni )Si –p i (m1i,…,mni )Li ]
where πi is profit of facility i, P is output price and Ci represents the facility’s production cost structure 
which depends on output level. We make the simplifying assumption that security costs are separable 
from production costs. The annual cost per unit of storage (Si) of implementing preventative security 
measures m1i m i depends on the measures themselves and is denoted by Ai We divide the
Government agencies have promulgated regulations to implement the U.S. Bioterrorism Act but 
it is often difficult to identify actual constraints in the implementation. A compliance guide 
prepared by the National Grain and Feed Association describes the regulations applicable to 
grain and oilseed facilities as follows: 
A R i t ti f f d D ti d f i f iliti ( d th i U S t ) th t prevent, prepare for and respond to bioterrorism and other public health emergencies. One of 
the important features of the U.S. Bioterrorism Act of 2002 is its emphasis on prevention, a 
change from prior legislation that focused on punishments after an incidence had occurred. The 
U.S. Bioterrorism Act does not address food safety issues in general; its focus is to prevent 
intentional contamination. 
The objective of this study was to assess the preparedness to potential bioterrorism in the grain 
and oilseed sector based on facility security expenditures and history of security breaches. The 
study was conducted as a research activity under the multistate project NC-1016 “Economic 
Assessment of Changes in Trade Arrangements, Bio-terrorism Threats and Renewable Fuels 
Requirements on the U.S. Grain and Oilseed Sector.”
measures m1i,…, mni, depends on the measures themselves and is denoted by Ai. We divide the 
expenditure in security measures by the size of the facility to eliminate the effect of size on cost. A 
facility that engages in preventative measures will face security costs of   A i(m1i,…,mni)Si .
The cost of implementing the security measures is modeled as a linear regression, that is,
(2) Ai = Xiα + εi , εi is iid N(0,σ2 )
In this regression,  Xi = [1  m1i,…mni] where Xi represents the row vector of dimension 1 x (n + 1) that 
represents the security measures at facility i and α is the (n + 1) x 1 column vector of parameters 
associated with the explanatory variables. The intercept parameter represents a fixed cost of securing 
a facility, while the slope parameters are estimates of the cost associated with each measure. 
Th b bilit f di ti t h i i f ilit i ii b hi h i l f ti f th
A. Registration of food processors: Domestic and foreign facilities (and their U.S. agents) that 
manufacture, process, pack or hold food for human or animal consumption in the U.S. were to 
be registered with the FDA. According to the registration requirement, all establishments at 
which food is manufactured or processed, packed or held are required to be registered. The 
“collecting facilities” are described as the facilities that store or hold food, such as silos or grain 
elevators; hence such a facility must be registered with the FDA because food is held by the 
facility. Facility registration is required for grain elevators, feed mills, flour mills, corn and oilseed 
processors, pet food manufacturers, renderers and others. The information mainly comprises of 
the description of food products including their brand names and general food categories along 
with the facility address and the contact information. 
B Maintenance of records: Facilities are required to establish and maintain records containing
Results
In addition to assessing preparedness, the study investigated the relationship between adoption 
of security measures and breaches in facility security. Finally the study documents, for a small 
sample, the extent to which grain and oilseed facilities appear to be following regulations that 
implement the U.S. Bioterrorism Act.
The probability of a disruptive event happening in facility i is given by pi, which is also a function of the 
security measures implemented at the facility. Thus the last component in the expected profit function    
pi (m1,…,mn)Li, is the expected monetary loss due to a disruptive event that takes place in the facility. 
We model pi as a logit regression such that,
(3) logit ( pi ) = Xiβ ,
where β denotes the  vector of parameters that we wish to estimate. A negative sign of the parameter 
indicates that facilities that adopted the measure are associated with smaller incidence of disruptive 
events. Profit maximization is achieved by selecting the optimal level of output and security measures 
to implement.
Study Framework
B. Maintenance of records: Facilities are required to establish and maintain records containing 
information that is „reasonably available‟. The information includes 
a) Immediate previous source (the seller) 
b) Immediate subsequent recipient (the buyer) 
c) The dates of inbound and outbound shipments 
d) Type and quantity of agricultural commodity received and shipped
e) Identity and contact information of the transporter 
Results
Few Pearson correlation coefficients between the adoption of security measures and security breaches 
were statistically significant. We found that some security measures were correlated with each other. 
In the estimation of equation 2 which relates security spending per unit of storage capacity to the 
preventative measures implemented at a facility, we found that only the amount of product being tested 
can explain the variation of spending around its mean. The R-squared of this regression is 0.4793 
(Table 5). The parameter estimates indicate that, on average, facilities that test 100% of their product 
spend $19,977 less per thousand of bushels of storage capacity on security than facilities that test less 
than 50% of product; and facilities that test less than 100% but more than 50% of their product spend 
$19,928 less per thousand of bushels of storage capacity on security than facilities that test less than 
Study Framework
A questionnaire was sent to all grain and oilseed  processors, elevators, feed mills and feed 
stores in Arkansas in order to obtain information regarding the existence and response to 
bioterrorism. From the population of 258 facilities, a total of 46 responded. Table 1 shows  the 
response distribution of facilities by type.
Table 1. Facilities by type
When asked how current security measures compare to those in place before 2002, 50% of 
facilities reported better security. Facility surveillance systems and on-line security protection 
were implemented by over 20% of facilities after 2002 (Table 3). Still, only slightly over half of 
facilities reported having a surveillance system. Only a third of facilities had controlled gate 
access, perimeter fencing, or quarantine procedures in place. Average annual expenditure 
per facility for security was $11,292.
50% of product.
Equation 3 of our model posited that the probability of security breach outcomes are a function of the 
security measures in place at a facility. However, this model was not  well supported by our data. None 
of the logistic regression models that we estimated indicated the presence of such an effect. These 
results are not surprising as the Pearson correlation coefficients of the security events and the security 
measures were not statistically significant.
Facility Type Number Percent
Country elevator 18 39.1
River elevator 3 6.5
Feed mill 3 6.5
Rice mill 3 6.5
Soybean processor 3 6.5
Seed facility 6 13.0
Feed store 10 21.7
Total 46 100.0
The most common security breaches reported by facilities were minor theft minor vandalism
Plant Security Measures






Record-keeping system that tracks commodities 12.2 70.7 17.1 41
Disaster training 48.8 32.6 18.6 43
Quarantine procedures 67.5 27.5 5.0 40
Coordination agreement between facility and first 
responder authorities
54.8 30.9 14.3 42
Security lighting 0.0 91.1 8.9 45






Intercept (Test < 50%) 20,002 4,170 <.0001
Table 5. OLS Parameter Estimates of Security Spending
Type of Event
% with one or 
more events N
Unauthorized entry 27 45
Minor vandalism ($1-3,000 )  36 45
The most common security breaches reported by facilities were minor theft, minor vandalism 
and unauthorized entry (Table 2). None of the facilities reported intentional contamination, 
transport sabotage or bomb threats.
Table 2. Percent of facilities who reported security breaches over the last 5 years 
(2006-2010)
Perimeter fencing 69.1 21.4 9.5 42
Controlled gate access  69.0 19.1 11.9 42
Facility surveillance system (alarms, video, etc.)  48.8 25.6 25.6 43
Employees are trained to report suspicious behavior 
to management
7.0 74.4 18.6 43
Computers and on-line security protection 50.0 28.6 21.4 42
Barriers to prevent access to ladders, catwalks, and 
other entry points 
53.6 41.5 4.9 41
Over three quarters of facilities tested every load delivered on receipt, both before and after 
2002 (Table 4).
Conclusions
This study found that facilities have limited investment and expenditures on facility security. Our failure 
to establish a connection between security practices and breaches may indicate that facility decision 
makers have different preference functions for risk. The adoption rates and the variety of comments 
received  from respondents indicates that a full understanding  and/or enforcement regarding 
implementation of the U.S. Bioterrorism Act of 2002 are lacking.
Test 100% -19,977 4,356 0.0001
Test >50% -19,928 5,897 0.0026
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Major vandalism ($3,001 or more)  2 42
Intentional contamination of the grain 0 45
Sabotage of the transport infrastructure 0 45
Minor theft ($1-3,000) 50 44
Major theft ($3,001 or more) 13 45
Bomb threat  0 45
()
Test every load 
delivered upon receipt
Test over 50% 
of loads delivered
Test less than 
50% of loads delivered N
Before 2002 76.5 5.9 17.6 34
Since 2002 77.8 5.5 16.7 36
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